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mechanism? An investigation using
threshold cointegration and error
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E-mail: anto_paradiso@hotmail.com
This work investigates the mortgage equity withdrawal mechanism in the
US economy from an empirical perspective. Using the threshold
cointegration test of Enders and Siklos (2001), which allows for
asymmetric adjustment, we find a cointegrating relationship among
mortgage equity withdrawal, house prices and interest rates. In particular,
we find that the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium is highly
persistent above the appropriate estimated threshold, namely in the
presence of favourable news. This finding is consistent with the theory of
habit formation (Duesenberry, 1949) and conspicuous consumption
(Veblen, 1899). Furthermore, this result helps to understand the complex
issue of the consumption boom of the late 1990s.
Keywords: mortgage equity withdrawal; house prices; mortgage interest
rates; threshold cointegration; habit consumption
JEL Classification: D12; C22; O51
I. Introduction
The Mortgage Equity Withdrawal (MEW) – defined
as the amount of equity that consumers withdraw
from their homes through home equity loans or lines
of credit and cash-out refinancing – is considered an
important variable in explaining the extraordinary
consumption growth in the last 20 years. Hatzius
(2006) argues that MEW has a statistically significant
and large effect on consumer spending; between 50%
and 62% ofMEW flows into consumption. Smith and
Searle (2008) maintain that MEW is the mechanism
for transmitting the wealth effects of housing into the
whole economy, in particular from the 1990s. A cross-
country study by Catte et al. (2004) shows that 20% of
MEW goes into consumption for the US economy.
For understanding the contribution of home equity
extraction on the economy, Riholtz (2009) calculates
that MEW accounted for more than 75% of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) growth from 2003 to 2006.
Notwithstanding the interest in studying the MEW
contribution on consumption and output growth, to
the best of our knowledge there are few studies in the
literature that explain the theoretical and empirical
aspects of the MEW mechanism.1 In this study, we
attempt to address the problem from an empirical
1 The majority of the empirical works in the literature study the MEW using panel data (see, e.g. Banks et al., 2004; Case et al.,
2005; Schwartz et al., 2008).
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point of view by examining the variables that drive
home equity extraction. Following the work of Duca
and Kumar (2011), we identify house prices and
mortgage interest rates as the key variables driving
equity extraction. Our empirical methodology is
based on the threshold cointegration technique of
Enders and Siklos (2001), which allows for asymmet-
ric adjustment. This is important because it is possible
that homeowners will differ in the sensitivity (or
velocity) of their reactions to positive or negative
shocks. Our results show that departures from the
long-run equilibrium, above (due to favourable news)
and below (due to unfavourable news) an appropriate
threshold, have different patterns of adjustment back
to equilibrium. The adjustment process is highly
persistent (almost 1 year) above the threshold and
almost immediate (less than two quarters) below the
threshold. If the MEW actually fuelled consumption
expenditures in the past years (as explained by
Greenspan and Kennedy, 2005; Hatzius, 2006;
Smith and Searle, 2008), the sluggish adjustment to
favourable shocks is consistent with the theories of
habit formation (Duesenberry, 1949; Abel, 1990;
Carroll et al., 2000; Fuhrer, 2000) and conspicuous
consumption (Veblen, 1899; Frank, 1997; O’Cass and
McEwen, 2006). Habit consumption occurs because
consumers are reluctant to reduce consumption;
instead, conspicuous consumption occurs when con-
sumers purchase goods and services to appear richer
and acquire status and prestige in the society.
Our findings are also important for a better
understanding of the complex issue of the consump-
tion boom of the late 1990s.2 FED was criticized for
fixing interest rates too low for too long after the
2001 crisis, favouring the housing bubble (Schwartz,
2009; Taylor, 2009; Labonte, 2011) in a fear of a new
recession/slowdown of the economy (Bernanke,
2010). These extraordinarily low interest rates accel-
erated the run-up in house prices and favoured the
usage of MEW as an ATM machine for funding
consumption spending. The easy way to obtain funds
from the equity of their homes generated spending
habits. The habit formation and the desire of higher
consumption level, powered by MEW mechanism,
puts the FED in a position of responsibility for
having brought with its policy the consumption on
unsustainable patterns. This position is in accordance
with Taylor’s (2009) view.
Our article is organized as follows. Section II
describes the MEW equation that we estimated and
the threshold cointegration technique. Section III
presents the empirical results. In particular, after the
data description, the classical Engle–Granger two-
step cointegration and the threshold cointegration
tests are presented. Then, the asymmetric error-
correction model is estimated. This section concludes
with a stability test of the estimated equation.
Section IV details our conclusions.
II. MEW Equation Specification and
Threshold Cointegration Test
The MEW equation specification
Very few papers in the literature describe the MEW
mechanism. Duca and Kumar (2011) maintain that
the propensity for withdrawing housing equity rises
with house price appreciation and with lower interest
rates. In the presence of increasing house prices,
homeowners can withdraw housing equity by taking
out a second mortgage or refinancing their old
mortgage with a larger loan.3 Due to the transaction
costs of refinancing, the incentive to withdraw
housing equity is enhanced if borrowers encounter
low mortgage rates. This suggests that the main
variables explaining the MEW mechanism are house
prices and mortgage rates. A problem arises regard-
ing the appropriate measure of interest rates, nominal
or real. This is because mortgage debt is contracted in
nominal terms, such as the payments owed, and thus
households could be more sensitive to nominal
interest rate movements. For this reason, we consider
both real and nominal interest rate measures in the
analysis and rely on the estimation results to decide
which measure is more appropriate.
According to the above discussion, the MEW
functions in the two interest rate formulations are
mewt ¼ 0 þ 1hpt þ 2imort þ t Model 1ð Þ ð1Þ
mewt ¼ 0 þ 1hpt þ 2rimort þ t Model 2ð Þ ð2Þ
where mew, hp, imor and rimor denote the mortgage
equity withdrawal, house prices, nominal interest
rates and real interest rates, respectively. t denotes
the residual of the MEW equation. In Equations 1
2 For a review of this topic, see, for example, Guidolin and La Jeunesse (2007).
3An important distinction is between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ MEW. While the former consists of cash-out refinancing and home
equity borrowing, which are discretionary actions to extract home equity, the latter is the equity released during housing turn-
over. In our analysis we consider the active MEW, and it is expressed in terms of disposable income. We consider this variable
because it is considered by the literature as affecting consumption significantly (see Canner et al., 2002; Hatzius, 2006), and for
this reason it is very interesting.
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and 2, MEW is measured as a ratio of disposable
personal income and hp is measured in real (year-
on-year) growth rates. Details on data constructions
and sources are in Section III.
Threshold cointegration
This article employs the threshold cointegration
approach introduced by Enders and Granger (1998)
and further refined by Enders and Siklos (2001). Let
fxitgT1 denote the observable random variables inte-
grated of order one, i.e. I(1). The long-run equilib-
rium relationship is given by
x1t ¼ 0 þ 2x2t þ    þ nxnt þ t ð3Þ
where 0 is the constant, 2, . . . ,n are the estimated
parameters and t is the disturbance term. The
existence of the long-run relationship requires t to
be stationary. The stationarity of t has to be
investigated in the second step, after having estimated
the long-run relationship using the OLS method.4
The second step procedure is given by
Dt ¼ t1 þ "t ð4Þ
where "t is the white noise disturbance. If 25 5 0,
the long-run equilibrium (3) with symmetric adjust-
ment is accepted. However, this procedure is mis-
specified if the adjustment process is asymmetric and
therefore, Enders and Siklos (2001) proposed the
following asymmetric adjustment model, called the
Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model
Dt ¼ It1t1 þ 1 Itð Þ2t1 þ "t ð5Þ
It ¼
1 if t1  
0 if t15 

ð6Þ
where It is the Heaviside indicator and  is the value
of the threshold. The threshold value , which is
unknown, is estimated according to Chan’s (1993)
method, as suggested by Enders and Siklos (2001).
The TAR model with a Consistent threshold is
denoted as a TAR-C model.
Since the exact nature of nonlinearity is not known,
it is also possible to allow the adjustment to depend
on the change in t1 (i.e. Dt1) instead of the level
of t1. In this case, the Heaviside indicator in
Equation 6 becomes
It ¼
1 if Dt1  
0 if Dt15 

ð7Þ
This variant of the model is used by Enders and
Granger (1998) and Caner and Hansen (1998) and
allows a variable to display differing amounts of
autoregressive decay depending on whether it is
increasing or decreasing. This model is known as
the Momentum-TAR model with a Consistent
(M-TAR-C) threshold. To satisfy the necessary and
sufficient conditions of the stationarity of t,
15 0, 25 0, ð1þ 1Þð1þ 2Þ5 1 is required.
Moreover, Enders and Siklos (2001) have proposed
tests when  is known ( ¼ 0). In this case, the above
two models are called TAR and M-TAR, respec-
tively. When the adjustment process (Equation 5) is
serially correlated, Equation 5 is rewritten as
Dt ¼ It1t1 þ 1 Itð Þ2t1 þ
Xp
i¼1
iDtp þ "t
ð8Þ
To test for threshold cointegration, Enders and Siklos
(2001) proposed the -test statistic. The -statistic is
computed using an F-statistic which tests for the null
hypothesis 1 ¼ 2 ¼ 0. The F-statistic for the null
hypothesis 1 ¼ 2 ¼ 0 using the TAR specification
of (6) and M-TAR specification of (7) are called 
and , respectively. The critical values to test the
null hypothesis in the case of three variables are
tabulated by Enders and Dibooglu (2001). If the null
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected, the null
hypothesis 1 ¼ 2 can be tested with a standard
F-statistic. The equilibrium relationship with sym-
metric adjustment is accepted when the null hypoth-
esis with no cointegration is rejected and the null
hypothesis 1 ¼ 2 is not rejected.
III. Empirical Results
Data and unit root tests
The variables used in our analysis are active MEW,
house prices and mortgage rates in nominal and real
terms. MEW is the equity extracted from the existing
homes via cash-out refinancing, home equity bor-
rowing and housing turn-over. The data is taken from
Greenspan and Kennedy’s (2008) dataset. In our
analysis, we consider the active MEW (see footnote 3
on this point) and it is expressed in terms of
disposable income; we denote this variable as mew.
House prices are the year-on-year growth rate of
4 Enders and Siklos (2001) use this method in their procedure. For maintaining coherence with their procedure, we also use the
OLS method.
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Standard and Poor’s/Case–Shiller home price index
(deflated for the US consumer price index). This
variable is denoted as hp in our analysis. The
mortgage interest rate (taken from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis data set (FRED)) is
considered in nominal (imor) and real (rimor) terms
for reasons explained in Section II. Time series plot of
the data and descriptive statistics are reported in the
Appendix.
The integrated properties of the variables are tested
with Lee and Strazicich’s (2003) two-break minimum
Lagrange Multipliers (LM) unit root tests. This is
because the period under investigation (1990Q2–
2008Q2) is characterized by important changes and
events. The three main events are the ‘Dot-com’
bubble (1998–2001), the house price bubble (2001–
2007) and the 2008 stock price crash. Other important
events are the technological progress in the 1990s,
financial deregulations in the last 20 years (see, e.g.
Sherman (2009) on this point) and the globalization
of the markets. The break dates, in Lee and
Strazicich’s test, are endogenously determined and
can be explained using a model allowing for two
shifts in the intercept (Model A) and trend (Model C)
as follows:
Model A: Zt ¼ ½1, t,D1t,D2t0
Djt ¼ 1 for t  TBj þ 1, j ¼ 1, 2 and 0 otherwise
 
ð9Þ
Model C: Zt ¼ ½1, t,D1t,D2t,DT1t,DT2t0
DTjt ¼ t TBj for t  TBj þ 1,

j ¼ 1, 2, and 0 otherwiseÞ ð10Þ
where TBj denotes the break date. Equations 9 and 10
state the null (H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1) of
the two models, respectively:
H0: yt ¼ 0 þ d1B1t þ d2B2t þ yt1 þ 1t;
H1: yt ¼ 1 þ tþ d1D1t þ d2D2t þ 2t
ð11Þ
H0: yt ¼ 0 þ d1B1t þ d2B2t þ d3D1t
þ d4D2t þ yt1 þ 1t;
H1: yt ¼ 1 þ tþ d1D1t þ d2D2t
þ d3DT1t þ d4DT2t þ 2t;
ð12Þ
1t and 2t are stationary error terms and Bjt ¼ 1
for t ¼ TBj þ 1, j ¼ 1, 2 and 0 otherwise. To attain the
LM test statistic, the following regression is
estimated:
Dyt ¼ 0DZt þ 	St1 þ t ð13Þ
where St ¼ yt   x  Zt, t ¼ 2, . . . ,T; the regres-
sion of Dyt provides estimates of ;  x ¼ y1  Zt
and the first observations of yt and Zt are y1 and Z1,
respectively. The LM statistic tests for the null
hypothesis of a unit root against otherwise. The
optimal lag lengths (from a maximum of eight
lags) are selected using the t-sig method of Ng and
Perron (1995).
The results are reported in Table 1. The test
statistics of the LM unit root tests for all variables do
not exceed the critical values in absolute terms, and
therefore the unit root null hypothesis cannot be
rejected at the 5% level. For the first differences of
these variables the unit root null is rejected at the 5%
level with the exception of hp for Model A, even if the
statistic value (3.78) is very close to the 5% critical
value (3.84) and well above the 10% critical value
(3.50). In the majority of the cases, the t-statistics
corresponding to the break dates are statistically
significant at the conventional levels (not reported for
brevity). The break dates cover different periods of
1990s and 2000s as expected, since, as we said, the
period under investigation comprises various and
important changes. Anyway, it is interesting to note
that the second break appears to occur after the
period 2004–2006 for mew and hp, which coincides
with the so-called house prices bubble and the peak of
subprime lending.
Symmetric cointegration test
Having established that the variables under investi-
gations – mew, hp, imor and rimor – are I(1),
a cointegrating relationship is possible. The estimated
long-run equilibrium relationships (using Engle–
Granger method) in the two versions are
mewt ¼ 8:252
9:74ð Þ
þ0:110hpt
5:29ð Þ
0:819imort
7:28ð Þ
þt Model 1ð Þ
ð14Þ
mewt ¼ 6:092
14:21ð Þ
þ0:166hpt
9:97ð Þ
0:892rimort
9:50ð Þ
þt Model 2ð Þ
ð15Þ
where parentheses show t-statistics and * denotes
significance at the 1% level. Table 2 presents the
results of tests for cointegration.
Since the test results are largely influenced by the
number of lags chosen (Haug, 1996), we employ two
criteria for sensitivity check: SIC and the data-
dependent method (t-sig) recommended by Ng and
Perron (1995). The maximum lag order (max) is set
according to the Schwert (1989) ‘rule of thumb’.
According to this rule, max ¼ int½12ðT=100Þ1=4,
where T is the number of observations and int
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denotes the integer portion of the content in brackets.
In our dataset, where T¼ 73, the maximum lag length
suggested by this rule is 11. Schwert’s rule is a
frequent choice in empirical research (Perron and Qu,
2007), but might be regarded as being rather conser-
vative. If the  selected is too large then the power of
the test suffers, therefore we fix a smaller max equal
to 8, in accordance with Breitung et al. (2004) and
Maki and Kitasaka (2006), for quarterly data. These
authors consider 2 years a sufficiently long period to
capture most of the correlation in the residuals.
From Table 2, it emerges that, for model 2 (real
mortgage interest rate), only in one case (maximum
lag equal to Schwert’s rule of thumb and optimal lag
selected according to SIC criteria) we can reject the
null of no cointegration at the 1% significance level.
In other cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no cointegration. This suggests that we cannot refuse
the hypothesis of no cointegration. Though there is
no cointegration in the symmetric EG cointegration
test, there might be a possibility of uncovered
asymmetric cointegration in the two models.
Asymmetric cointegration test
Table 3 presents the results for cointegration with
TAR, M-TAR, TAR-C and M-TAR-C for the
nominal (Model 1) and real (Model 2) interest rates.
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for
real mortgage rates in all threshold versions, but only
M-TAR-C version passes the 1 ¼ 2 test. In addi-
tion, this formulation exhibits the lower SIC criteria
(results available upon request by the author) and for
this reason it is preferred. The -statistic for this
formulation is 11.6 and is significant at the 1% level.
The symmetry test using the F-statistic rejects the
symmetry of the two adjustment parameters; the
negative adjustment parameter 2 is larger (in
Table 1. Two-break minimum LM unit root test 1990Q2–2008Q2
Model A Model C
Level First difference Level First difference
Variables
Test
statistic
Break
dates
Test
statistic
Break
dates
Test
statistic
Break
dates
Test
statistic
Break
dates
mew 3.133
[6]
2001Q1;
2004Q2
5.950
[2]
2003Q1;
2006Q4
5.140
[3]
2000Q4;
2006Q1
11.051
[2]
2003Q2;
2005Q2
hp 2.092
[8]
1994Q1;
2006Q2
3.782
[0]
2000Q2;
2005Q1
4.794
[4]
1998Q2;
2004Q3
6.570
[7]
1994Q1;
2005Q1
imor 3.446
[3]
1996Q1;
2001Q1
5.981
[1]
1993Q1;
2000Q4
4.421
[1]
1993Q4;
2003Q1
7.087
[3]
1994Q3;
1999Q3
rimor 3.296
[7]
1997Q1;
2005Q2
4.378
[1]
1999Q3;
2002Q4
4.552
[5]
1998Q1;
2006Q2
7.086
[7]
1994Q3;
2006Q3
Notes: The 5% and 10% critical values for Model A are 3.842 and 3.504, respectively. The 5% and 10% critical values for
Model C are 5.286 and 4.989, respectively. The number in square brackets indicates the optimal number of lagged first-
differenced terms included in the unit root test. The trimming region is (0.15T, 0.85T), where T is the sample size. Critical
values are taken from Lee and Strazicich (2003). Kumar and Webber (2013) provide more details on this test. RATS 7.2 was
used to perform this test.
Table 2. The results of classical residual-based cointegration test
t Model 1 t Model 2
max
Schwert’s criteria
(lag¼ 11)
Schwert’s
criteria (lag¼ 11) 8
Schwert’s
criteria (lag¼ 11)
Schwert’s
criteria (lag¼ 11) 8
Optimal  SIC (lag¼ 1) t-sig (lag¼ 9) t-sig (lag¼ 7) SIC (lag¼ 0) t-sig (lag¼ 11) t-sig (lag¼ 7)
EG test value 2.694 1.747 1.447 4.524* 0.537 1.629
Notes: Schwert’s (1989) criteria assumes that max ¼ int½12ðT=100Þ1=4 ¼ 11. Critical values are 4.05, 3.42 and 3.10 at 1%,
5% and 10% significance level, respectively (MacKinnon, 1991). SIC¼ Schwartz Information Criterion.
*Denotes significance at the 1% level.
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absolute value) than the positive adjustment param-
eter 1. Diagnostic checking on residuals shows that
there is no autocorrelation (Breusch–Godfrey test for
autocorrelation conducted at lag one and four), and
therefore the model is correctly specified.
Threshold error-correction test
The positive finding of a long-run equilibrium rela-
tion with asymmetric adjustment justifies estimating
the error-correction representation in the M-TAR-C
framework. The three estimated error-correction
equations with threshold are given by
Dmewt ¼ 0:054ð1:09Þ  0:321Itt13:72ð Þ  0:704 1 Itð Þt15:16ð Þ
þ A11 Lð ÞDmewt1
F115 0:01
þA12 Lð ÞDhpt1
F12¼0:80
ð16Þ
þ A13 Lð ÞDrimort1
F13¼0:96
þ 2:142D1t
4:65ð Þ
þ 2:121D2t
5:11ð Þ
þ
1t
R2 ¼ 0:69 JB ¼ 2:21 ½0:33
BG 1, 4ð Þ ¼ ½0:75, 0:10 BPG ¼ 2:22 ½0:07
Drimort ¼ 0:0110:18ð Þ  0:267Itt12:39ð Þ  0:220 1 Itð Þt11:28ð Þ
þ A21 Lð ÞDmewt1
F21¼0:15
þA22 Lð ÞDhpt1
F22¼0:02
ð17Þ
þ A23 Lð ÞDrimort1
F23¼0:11
 1:774D3t
3:26ð Þ
þ
2t
R2 ¼ 0:22 JB ¼ 0:37 ½0:83
BG 1, 4ð Þ ¼ ½0:52, 0:06 BPG ¼ 0:51 ½0:86
Dhpt ¼ 0:013
0:11ð Þ
 0:221Itt1
1:08ð Þ
þ 0:153 1 Itð Þt1
0:48ð Þ
þ A31 Lð ÞDmewt1
F31¼0:07
þA32 Lð ÞDhpt1
F325 0:01
ð18Þ
þ A33 Lð ÞDrimort1
F33¼0:08
 4:356D3t
4:36ð Þ
þ
3t
R2 ¼ 0:60 JB ¼ 0:57 ½0:75
BG 1, 4ð Þ ¼ ½0:07, 0:11 BPG ¼ 2:75 ½0:01
where the estimation period is 1990Q2–2008Q2,

t  I:I:D:ð0, 2Þ, and F equals the p-value for the
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the two lags of
each variable used are equal to zero. The t-statistics
of coefficient estimations are reported in parentheses,
while ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and
10% levels, respectively; p-values of residual diag-
nostic tests are in square brackets. Di are impulse
dummies: D1¼ 2004Q2 corresponds to a huge
increase in the house prices (þ11% compared to the
same period of the previous year); D2¼ 2003Q3
relates to the peak value (billions of $) of mortgage
refinancing in that year; D3¼ 2007Q4 is the beginning
of the US recession (Hamilton, 2010). It is interesting
to note that these dummies are in line with the breaks
detected by Lee and Strazicich’s unit root test, with
the exception of the D3 dummy. This is plausible since
Lee and Strazicich’s test is unable to detect the break
very close to the end of the sample. There is no
evidence of serial correlation on the residuals
(Breusch–Godfrey (BG) test, conducted at lag 1 and
4, shows p-values larger than the standard signifi-
cance level of 0.05 in all equations); the residuals
appear normal (Jarque–Bera (JB) test exhibits
p-values >0.05), and have a constant variance
(Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey (BPG) test for
Table 3. The results of asymmetric cointegration tests
Model Lag 1 2  or 
 1 ¼ 2 BG(1,4)
Model 1 TAR 1 0.246 (0.123)* 0.268 (0.137)* 3.626 0.016 [0.14,0.64]
M-TAR 1 0.285 (0.137)** 0.231 (0.127)* 3.664 0.086 [0.12,0.61]
TAR-C (¼1.171) 1 0.208 (0.111)* 0.370 (0.167)** 3.996 0.686 [0.12,0.52]
M-TAR-C (¼0.764) 1 0.182 (0.093)* 1.068 (0.306)*** 7.906* 7.752*** [0.46,0.96]
Model 2 TAR 0 0.390 (0.124)*** 0.569 (0.168)*** 10.709** 0.734 [0.69,0.70]
M-TAR 0 0.392 (0.132)*** 0.531 (0.154)*** 10.410** 0.473 [0.32,0.87]
TAR-C (¼0.672) 0 0.372 (0.116)*** 0.665 (0.188)*** 11.370*** 1.757 [0.55,0.96]
M-TAR-C (¼0.605) 0 0.382 (0.108)*** 0.786 (0.238)*** 11.633*** 2.386* [0.62,0.97]
Notes: SEs of the coefficients are in parentheses; the statistics reported in square brackets are p-values for serial correlation
test.  is the threshold level endogenously determined according to Chan’s (1993) method. BG(p)¼Breusch–Godfrey test for
serial correlation of order p. is the F-statistic for the null hypothesis of no threshold cointegration. Critical values for  are
tabulated by Enders and Dibooglu (2001). Critical values for Model 1 (one lag) are 6.24 (10%), 7.49 (5%), 10.15 (1%) for
TAR and 6.72 (10%), 7.92 (5%), 10.66 (1%) for MTAR. Critical values for Model 2 (zero lag) are 6.53 (10%), 7.80 (5%),
10.90 (1%) for TAR and 6.98 (10%), 8.30 (5%), 11.4 (1%) for MTAR. 1 ¼ 2 is the F-statistic that the two coefficients are
equal.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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heteroscedasticity with p-values >0.05) with the
exception of house prices error-correction
equation (16).
The asymmetric adjustment process of the mew
mechanism (16) shows that the adjustment is almost
immediate (the speed of adjustment coefficient is
equal to 0.71) for negative deviations from equilib-
rium (actual mew deviation from equilibrium below
the appropriate threshold). This negative disequilib-
rium (caused by negative news) is absorbed in less
than two quarters, whereas a positive disequilibrium
(actual mew discrepancy from equilibrium above the
threshold, due to positive shocks) is eliminated after
almost 1 year (the speed of adjustment coefficient is
0.32). This means that good news are not absorbed
immediately; the cash-out mechanism is only gradu-
ally restored when good news happen. If the MEW is
used as an ATM machine (in the words of Klyuev
and Mills, 2007) to finance consumption,5 the result
(i.e. 15 2) is compatible with the theories of
consumption of habit formation (Abel, 1990;
Carroll et al., 2000; Fuhrer, 2000) and conspicuous
consumption (Veblen, 1899; Frank, 1997; O’Cass and
McEwen, 2006). According to the first theory,
consumption patterns are subject to habit and are
slow to fall in the face of negative shocks. ‘The
fundamental psychological postulate underlying our
argument is that it is harder for a family to reduce its
expenditure from a higher level than for a family to
refrain from making high expenditures in the first
place (Duesenberry, 1949, pp. 84–85)’. According to
the second theory, ‘[t]he things we feel we ‘‘need’’
depend on the kinds of things that others have, and
our needs thus grow when we find ourselves of others
who have more than we do. Yet when all of us spend
more, the new, higher spending level simply becomes
the norm (Frank, 1997, p. 1840)’. If the MEW is an
ATM for consumption expenditures, then it is plau-
sible that consumers cannot reduce the needed cash
withdrawals and, eventually, they tend to increase the
cash-out over the time. This effect can be exacerbated
in the presence of liquidity constraints.
For completeness of the analysis, we also report the
threshold error-correction equations for rimor and hp.
Real mortgage rate changes (17) respond to a positive
disequilibrium; a rise inmew, caused by positive news,
implies a complete adjustment to the interest rates
after less than four quarters (the speed of adjustment
coefficient is 0.27). In addition, the current changes
in rimor are influenced by lagged changes in hp (A22).
Changes in house prices (18) are not influenced by the
long-run relation, but are influenced by lagged
changes in mew (A31) and rimor (A33).
Structural breaks and stability
We investigate the stability of our estimated equation
(16) in the light of the important changes that occurred
in the 20 years under investigation. In doing so, we
subject the threshold error-correction equation (16) to
the Quandt (1960) and Andrews (1993) structural
breakpoint tests. Using insights from Quandt (1960),
Andrews (1993) modified the Chow test to allow for
endogenous breakpoints in the sample for an esti-
mated model. This test is performed at every obser-
vation over the interval ½T, ð1 ÞT and computes
the supremum of the Fk statistics (supF ¼
supk2½T,ð1ÞT Fk), where  is a trimming parameter.
Andrews and Ploberger (1994) developed two addi-
tional test statistics, i.e. the average (ave F) and the
exponential (exp F). The null hypothesis of no break is
rejected if these test statistics are large; however,
Hansen (1997) derives an algorithm to compute
approximate asymptotic p-values of these tests.
Table 4 displays the Quandt–Andrews test results.
Results show that all the test statistics do not reject
the null of no structural breaks at the 1% level. The
detected break date, although statistically insignifi-
cant, is 2003Q3. This break date is not unexpected,
since it corresponds to the period of peak value
(billions of $) of mortgage refinancing as stated
previously. Based on these results, we infer that our
estimated equation is stable and robust.
IV. Conclusions
This article investigates a neglected issue in the
empirical financial literature: the variables that have
driven the MEW mechanism in the last 20 years of
the US economy. Following the work of Duca and
Kumar (2011), we select house prices and interest
rates as key explanatory variables. Then we study the
Table 4. Quandt–Andrews structural break tests, 1990Q2–
2008Q2
Statistics Value Break Probability
Max LR F-stat. 2.3124 2003Q3 1.0000
Max Wald F-stat. 28.8115 2003Q3 0.1800
Exp LR F-stat. 0.6850 – 1.0000
Exp Wald F-stat. 8.3359 – 0.1007
Ave LR F-stat. 1.3059 – 1.0000
Ave Wald F-stat. 11.7532 – 0.1549
Notes: Probabilities are calculated using Hansen’s (1997)
method. Eviews 7.0 was used to perform this test.
5 See Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), Hatzius (2006) and Smith and Searle (2008).
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long-run relationship between MEW and the two
above-mentioned variables using the threshold coin-
tegration test developed by Enders and Siklos (2001).
The threshold cointegration approach provides
strong evidence of the long-run relation characterized
by asymmetric adjustment. In particular, we show
that the adjustment process towards the equilibrium
is highly persistent (almost 1 year) above the appro-
priately estimated threshold; that is, in the presence of
favourable news. Comparatively, the adjustment
back to equilibrium is quick (two quarters) when
disequilibrium is below the appropriate threshold;
that is, in the presence of unfavourable news. This
finding is consistent with the theories of habit
formation (Duesenberry, 1949; Abel, 1990; Carroll
et al., 2000; Fuhrer, 2000) and conspicuous con-
sumption (Veblen, 1899; Frank, 1997; O’Cass and
McEwen, 2006). According to these theories, con-
sumption patterns are affected by ‘habit’ or ‘status
and prestige’, and for this reason they rarely reduce
but, eventually, tend to increase. If the MEW is an
ATM for consumption expenditures, then it is plau-
sible that consumers cannot reduce the needed cash
withdrawals.
Our main finding (asymmetric adjustment of MEW
with respect to long-run equilibrium level) is impor-
tant for a better understanding of the complex
issue of the consumption boom of the late 1990s.
After the 2001 recession, the FED – in a fear of a
new recession/slowdown of the economy (Bernanke,
2010) – fixed interest rates too low for too long (until
the end of 2004), and the resulting low mortgage rates
helped to inflate the bubble (Schwartz, 2009; Taylor,
2009; Labonte, 2011). The economy was very slow in
recovering from the 2001 recession. The weakness of
the recovery led the Federal Reserve Board to
continue to cut interest rates, pushing the federal
funds rate to 1% in the summer of 2003, a 50-year
low. Mortgage interest rates followed the federal
funds rate down. The average interest rate on 30-year
fixed rate mortgages fell to 5.25% in the summer of
2003, also a 50-year low. These extraordinarily low
interest rates accelerated the run-up in house prices,
favouring the usage of MEW as an ATM machine for
funding consumption spending. The easy way to
obtain funds from the equity of their homes gener-
ated the desire of higher consumption (caused by the
desire to appear richer). In addition, the extraordi-
nary low levels of interest rates altered the consump-
tion path favouring the formation of habit behaviour
(the reluctance in reducing consumption as you reach
a higher level) on unsustainable high patterns. The
habit formation and the desire to appear richer,
fuelled by MEW mechanism, puts the FED in a
position of responsibility for having brought the
consumption on unsustainable patterns with its
policy. This position is in accordance with Taylor’s
(2009) view, who explains that the FED held the
federal funds rate too low for too long during the
critical years between 2002 and 2005. He argues that,
if the FED instead had followed the Taylor Rule,
the boom and bust largely would have been avoided.
The literature on this topic is expanding rapidly,
but more empirical research is still needed.
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Fig. A1. mew, hp, imor, rimor (1990Q2–2008Q2)
Table A1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
mew 2.446 1.737 0.535 6.746
imor 7.316 1.181 5.510 10.340
rimor 4.404 1.131 1.720 6.510
hp 1.705 6.369 18.472 12.427
Notes: Min¼minimum value and Max¼maximum value. Data period is from 1990Q2 to 2008Q2.
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